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The banking crisis in Europe has three distinct legs according to Lorenzo Codogno and Mara
Monti. The ﬁrst leg was purely ﬁnancial contagion from the sub-prime crisis in the US to toxic
assets held in bank portfolios in Europe, while the second wave was equally intense, amid the
negative feedback loop between banks and sovereigns. The third wave is the lagged impact of the
economic crisis on the quality of loan portfolios: it has just triggered intervention by the Italian
government, but it may require additional public money across the EU. Public money injected today
is just a fraction of what was injected at the outset of the crisis. However, more than nine years
since the sub-prime crisis started, it is striking that the EU is still facing banking problems.
On 21 December 2016, the Italian Parliament authorised up to a 20 billion euro (1.2% of GDP)
increase in the public sector borrowing limit to provide capital support to Italian banks, justiﬁed as a
“precautionary” and “extraordinary event” that is “beyond the control of the State” and is needed to
preserve ﬁnancial stability. As the Bank of Italy put it, this was perceived as a “necessary step since
many Italian banks face a number of interrelated cyclical and structural challenges to sustainable
proﬁtability. This includes long-term macroeconomic headwinds such as low potential growth and
low inﬂation, a ﬂattening yield curve compressing margins, and weak diversiﬁcation of business models that are
highly reliant on the growth outlook.” It does not really sound like an “extraordinary event”.
On 23 December, the Italian government released its “Salva Risparmio” decree that creates a fund of up to 20 billion
euro to support the banking sector. In particular, the allotted funds will provide capital and liquidity to troubled
domestic ﬁnancial institutions and protect retail savers. The initiative is designed to help Italian banks in need of
additional capital and unable to raise capital on their own. The capital injection will alleviate the problem for some
weak banks and help the whole system to achieve more stability.
Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS), the third-largest Italian bank, will be the ﬁrst institution to beneﬁt from public
intervention. On 22 December, MPS announced it will not be able to complete its planned 5 billion euro capital
increase by year-end, as requested by the European Central Bank (ECB) following the results of the July 2016
stress tests. As a result, MPS applied for extraordinary government ﬁnancial support on 23 December. On 26
December, the bank announced that the ECB increased its capital request to 8.8 billion euro, which will come from
conversion of subordinated debt and fresh capital injection by the government as part of the 20 billion euro public
support already approved. This is the latest casualty of a European banking crisis that started in 2007 and has
continued in diﬀerent forms until today.
State aid granted during the crisis
Since 2007, the ﬁnancial crisis has had a major impact on ﬁnancial institutions across the EU. To reduce the
adverse eﬀects of the crisis and restore conﬁdence, EU governments approved State aid to ﬁnancial institutions in
diﬀerent forms: recapitalisations, impaired asset measures, guarantees, other liquidity measures. For each category
there are information on both the maximum amount of aid the European Commission allowed EU Member States to
grant (State aid approved) and the amount of aid actually implemented (State aid used). We cannot add the
amounts of the four types of measures as they are of diﬀerent nature. In particular, the sum of recapitalisation and
impaired asset measures depicts the actual amounts of funds authorised or injected to support the banking sector,
while the authorised or used guarantees and other liquidity measures are contingent liabilities and depict the
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exposure to risk.
For the whole of the EU, the total amount of authorised recapitalisations reached 802.1 billion euro, and the amount
actually used was 453.3 billion in 2008-2014, according to the State Aid Scoreboard of the European Commission.
The amount of authorised impaired asset measures reached 603.3 billion and 188.5 billion were used. The sum of
recapitalisation and impaired asset measures, i.e. crisis funds, gives a huge 1,405.4 billion authorised, i.e. 10.0% of
2014 EU GDP, and 641.8 billion used, i.e. 4.6% of 2014 EU GDP.
However, governments also used guarantees on liabilities and liquidity measures other than guarantees on
liabilities, i.e. contingent measures. In the same period, the maximum outstanding amount of approved guarantees
reached a whopping 3,249.0 billion or 23% of 2014 EU GDP, although only about a third was used, i.e. 1,188.1
billion, or 8.5% of 2014 EU GDP. Authorised liquidity measures reached a maximum of 229.7 billion, while those
actually used 105.0 billion. Summing the two types of contingent measures, the maximum exposure reached was
almost 25% of 2014 EU GDP for authorised measures and 9.3% of 2014 EU GDP for actually used measures. See
the Table 1 below for a summary.
Table 1: Total amount of State aid approved and used, EU-28 (2008-2014)
Note: (1) Maximum outstanding annual amounts during the period 2008-2014. Source:
European Commission, State Aid Scorecard.
These amounts depict State aid granted to ﬁnancial institutions within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). However, there are other supports provided to the banking sector
that do not qualify as ‘State aid’ as, for instance, capital injection into a State-owned bank. The amounts used for
State-owned Landesbank and Sparkasse interventions in Germany are not included in State aid statistics for that
country.
Table 2: State Aid used in 2008-2014
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Note: (1) Maximum outstanding annual amounts during the period 2008-2014, % of GDP
refers to the relevant year; the total for the EU refers to 2014 GDP. Source: Our calculations
based on European Commission’s State Aid Scoreboard and Ameco databases.
Moving to individual countries, the country that used recapitalisation funds the most over 2008-2014 was the United
Kingdom (100.1 billion euro), while it was Germany for impaired asset measures (80.0 billion). Summing the actual
amounts used of these two instruments of State aid, Germany was the country that most extensively intervened to
support its ﬁnancial sector during the crisis for a total amount of 144.1 billion euro, 4.8% of GDP. On top of this,
there was a sizeable exposure through guarantees (135.0 billion in 2009) and liquidity measures (4.7 billion in
2010). However, in percentage of German GDP these ﬁgures are relatively small (about 5.3%). The country that
used guarantees the most was Ireland for a maximum exposure of 284.3 billion in 2009, i.e. a monstrous 167.5% of
GDP. Then comes the UK with 158.2 billion in 2009 (9.3% of GDP). Liquidity measures other than guarantees on
liabilities were mostly used in the Netherlands for a maximum exposure of 30.4 billion euro in 2009 (4.9% of GDP).
Those banks directly exposed to assets that became impaired following the sub-prime crisis in the US experienced
major problems at the beginning of the crisis, i.e. in 2008, 2009 and 2010. The most exposed countries that injected
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public money at the outset of the ﬁnancial crisis were Germany, the UK, Ireland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark,
Luxembourg, Austria and to a lesser extent France. In 2008-2010, Germany spent 139.2 billion in crisis-related
State aid funds for ﬁnancial institutions, 134.1 billion the UK, 48.9 billion Ireland, 25.6 billion Belgium, 23.9 billion the
Netherlands, 23.7 billion France, 7.8 billion Austria and 2.6 billion Luxembourg. Germany and the UK accounted for
almost 62% of crisis-related State aid funds spent in the ﬁrst three years of the crisis in the EU. Please note that this
does not included support to State-owned ﬁnancial institutions, which in Germany account for a very large share of
the banking sector.
Summing up crisis funds (recapitalisations and impaired assets) for all the nine mentioned countries, we reach
almost 92% of State aid actually used in the EU in 2008-2010. Spending in France was limited to recapitalisation
and to the initial years of the crisis, i.e. 2008-2009. The same holds true for Belgium and the Netherlands (although
more sizeable as a percentage of GDP). The crisis was massive as a percentage of GDP in Ireland and it lasted for
longer (there was public capital injection also in 2011). During the ﬁrst phase of the crisis (2008-2010), aid spending
was very limited in Italy (4.1 billion loans mostly for Monte Paschi in 2009), Spain (13.7 billion), Portugal (3.1 billion),
Greece (3.8 billion), Slovenia (0.0 billion) and Cyprus (0.0).
Stylised evidence suggests that the global ﬁnancial crisis aﬀected immediately banks in the ﬁrst group of countries
and the countries recognised the problem and reacted swiftly by injecting public money. In Ireland, this happened
with some delay, with the major capital injection only happening in 2010, also courtesy of a substantial European
support. Irish State aid may be regarded as a lagged reaction to the ﬁrst leg of the crisis. Since 2010, public money
injection declined sharply. Moreover, sharply rising public deﬁcit and debt were a result of the banking crisis more
than the other way around. Therefore, we consider Ireland in the ﬁrst group of countries.
Spain suﬀered from the crisis since its very beginning. However, the response was delayed and the major problems
started with the negative feedback loop between the sovereign and the banks. Public money injection peaked only
in 2012. Therefore, we consider Spain as part of the second group of countries or the second wave of government
intervention linked to the government debt crisis.
The ﬁrst group of countries also massively intervened with contingent measures. The sum of guarantees on
liabilities and other liquidity measures other than guarantees peaked in 2009 to 807.5 billion, i.e. 10.4% of their GDP
and 89.1% of the total amount used in the EU.
Figure 1: State Aid funds used in 2008-2014
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Source: Own calculations based on the European Commission’s State Aid Scoreboard and
Ameco. Aggregated ﬁgures are weighted by countries’ GDP.
Figure 2: State Aid contingency measures in 2008-2014
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Source: Own calculations based on the European Commission’s State Aid Scoreboard and
Ameco. Aggregated ﬁgures are weighted by countries’ GDP.
The government bond crisis aﬀected banks in peripheral European countries mainly in three ways: (1) a liquidity
squeeze (disappearance of liquidity and activity in interbank markets, needed for the ﬁnancing gap), (2) losses in the
portfolios of assets, and (3) negative economic feedback on the loan portfolios. The government debt crisis started
in 2010 and aﬀected Greece, Spain, Portugal, Slovenia, Cyprus and Italy. We exclude Ireland for the reasons
previously mentioned and we isolate Italy as it behaved diﬀerently. In fact, since the outbreak of the government debt
crisis, peripheral countries (ES, PT, SI, CY) injected plenty of government capital into their banking sectors. Crisis
State aid funds used amounted to 146.4 billion between 2010 and 2013, i.e. 10.0% of their GDP. In 2012, as a
percentage of GDP there was a spike due to public interventions in Spain and Greece (Figure 1).
Meanwhile, contingent measures also steadily increased, while for core countries they steadily declined. Peripheral
countries started very late in providing contingent support to the banking sector and the maximum exposure was
reached only in 2012.
Italy was late in recognising the problem, either overly conﬁdent about the ability of banks to withstand the crisis or
overly worried about the negative sovereign-banks feedback loop. As a matter of fact, intervention was very limited
and eﬀectively restricted to loans to Monte Paschi and a few other banks. In 2012, guarantees skyrocketed but the
government mostly used them to guarantee an interbank institution (Conﬁdi), which in turn provided partial
guarantees to bank loans to SMEs. It peaked to 85.7 billion, i.e. 5.3% of Italy’s GDP in 2012.
What was the impact on government deﬁcit and debt?
State aid data do not represent the actual cost for public ﬁnances resulting from public intervention in favour of
ﬁnancial institutions. For instance, recapitalisation data show the gross amount of funds injected into the banking
sector. However, some funds provided to ﬁnancial institutions during the crisis have already been re-paid, some
banks have been re-privatised and some loans have been reimbursed. Data on impaired asset measures show the
amounts of aid calculated as the transfer value minus the market value, and the unwinding of impaired asset
measures is not taken into account. In other words, State aid data depict the gross amount injected and not the net
one. Moreover, the overall exposures to guarantees or “contingent liabilities” represent risk, but not an actual cost. It
becomes a cost if the guarantees are called, but only a small fraction of guarantees were called.
To see the ﬁscal impacts of government intervention on government deﬁcit and debt we need to look at Eurostat
data, which show the ﬁscal impact of public support measures. Recapitalisation measures and impaired asset
measures are split into an expenditure component (the part of the transaction that is written oﬀ immediately) that is
reported in ﬂows and impact government deﬁcit/surplus, and an investment component that has no impact on the
deﬁcit/surplus and is only reﬂected as an addition to the stock of ﬁnancial assets. Eurostat data include ﬂows and the
stock of liabilities include an imputed component related to the cost of borrowing of the government.
The case of capital injection into state-owned banks mentioned above does not give rise to State aid, but it does
aﬀect debt and potentially also deﬁcit/surplus ﬁgures. The increase in assets is recorded but it does not contribute to
reducing government debt (according to Maastricht criteria, debt is recorded on a gross basis). Overall, Eurostat
data are more comprehensive as measures of the economic and ﬁnancial impact of government intervention as
State aid ﬁgures serve a diﬀerent purpose.
In 2015, the latest available year of the database, the increase in deﬁcit was particularly large in Greece (4.1% of
GDP), mainly due to past recapitalisation of the National Bank of Greece and Piraeus Bank. The second most
signiﬁcant impact on the deﬁcit was recorded in Portugal (1.6% of GDP) in the context of the Banco Internacional do
Funchal S.A. resolution operation. Slovenia followed with 1.4% of GDP, where the impact was mostly due to
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operations of loan write-oﬀs and conversions into real estate and equity carried out by BAMC (a bad bank classiﬁed
inside government).
Then, there was the Cyprus case for 0.9% of GDP. Ireland used 0.7% of GDP for recapitalisation of the Cooperative
Central Bank and Austria 0.6% of GDP for the nationalisation of Hypo-Alpe-Adria-Bank International AG. Over 2008-
2015, the most sizeable impact on the deﬁcit as percentage of GDP was recorded in Ireland in 2010 (21.3%),
Greece in 2013 (10.8% of GDP), Slovenia in 2013 (10.2%) and Cyprus in 2014 (8.5%). In cumulative terms, Ireland
recorded a cumulative impact on the deﬁcit of 27.4% of GDP.
In the period 2008-2014, the worsening of deﬁcit ﬁgures was much smaller than the total amount of State aid
actually used, meaning that a number of interventions were considered as ‘investment’ as thus aﬀected debt ﬁgures
only (liabilities) and the assets position in 2008-2015. In a few countries (Denmark, France, Luxemburg, Hungary,
Sweden) the cumulative impact on deﬁcit/surplus ﬁgures was positive due to fees on guarantees granted to ﬁnancial
institutions, property income (interests and dividends) receivable from ﬁnancial instruments acquired by
governments, and from other revenues such as speciﬁc capital taxes.
The cumulative negative impact on deﬁcit/surplus was 114.0 billion for the ﬁrst group of countries and 94.7 billion for
the second group; for Italy, it was 3.2 billion. In percentage of the relevant GDP, the impact was negative for 1.4%,
6.5% and 0.2% respectively.
The total impact on government debt for the EU reached a maximum of 765.1 billion in 2012 (4.3% of GDP). For the
ﬁrst groups of countries (DE, UK, BE, NL, FR, AT, DK, IE, LU) the maximum impact of debt was recorded in 2010
with 584.9 billion (7.2% of their GDP), while for the second group (ES, PT, EL, SI, CY) the maximum impact was
recorded in 2015 with 127.7 billion (8.6% of their GDP). For Italy, the peak was reached in 2013 with 4.1 billion
(0.3% of GDP). Let us remind that the ﬁrst group accounted for 66.6% of EU GDP in 2015, while the second group
only for 10.1% and Italy for 11.2%.
Figure 3: Impact on general government net borrowing requirement
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Source: Own calculations based on the Eurostat and Ameco data. Aggregated ﬁgures are
weighted by countries’ GDP.
Figure 4: Impact on general government debt
Source: Own calculations based on the Eurostat and Ameco data. Aggregated ﬁgures are
weighted by countries’ GDP.
Figure 5: Contingency liabilities
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Source: Own calculations based on the Eurostat and Ameco data. Aggregated ﬁgures are
weighted by countries’ GDP.
Interestingly, the impact of general government debt peaked in 2010 for the ﬁrst group of countries and since then it
has declined, while for the second group it has increased throughout the period. Moreover, for the ﬁrst group of
countries the amount of assets was close to that of liabilities at the beginning of the crisis, the gap widened in 2010
and since then it has remained broadly stable, suggesting moderate losses on the ‘investment’ in the ﬁnancial
sector. For the second group of countries the gap has continued to widen since 2011, suggesting signiﬁcant losses
on the ‘investment’ made by the governments. In 2015, the outstanding amounts of liabilities and assets related to
government intervention were 8.6% and 2.0% of GDP respectively (Figure 4).
The widening gap is explained by loan write-oﬀ and conversion into real estate and equity (Slovenia), a fall in the
market value of bank shares held by government (Greece) or redemption and conversion of preference shares of
banks (Ireland). In all cases, it is eﬀectively a loss for the governments according to market valuations.
The banking crisis has not yet come to an end
While the ﬁrst two factors that aﬀected peripheral countries since the debt crisis (a liquidity squeeze and losses in
the portfolios of assets) were immediate, the negative economic feedback on the loan portfolios is a creeping slow-
moving phenomenon, which may eventually force a new wave of government intervention.
Table 3 shows the stock of non-performing loans in EU countries. While in some countries, courtesy of a decent
economic recovery, the stock has moved back to low levels in percentage of the GDP of the country, in others it
remains very high.
With MPS intervention, Italy is the latest European country that uses State aid for banks. As State aid is no longer
allowed by European rules, it used Art.32 of the Bank Restructuring and Resolution Directive (BRRD) to circumvent
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bail-in and inject what is called “precautionary recapitalisation” to preserve ﬁnancial stability.
Table 3: Non-performing loans to total gross loans and advances
Source: EBA
It is not clear whether the 20 billion allotted by Italy for intervention in the banking sector will be enough. The non-
performing exposure (bad debt, likely defaults, non-performing past due loans/exposures) amounted to 356 billion
and net of provisioning to 191 billion in the second quarter of 2016. In the third quarter, they declined to 328 billion or
10/12
16.5% of total loans, almost 20% of GDP. Bad loans were 199.1 billion in November 2016 and net of provisions 85.2
billion. Banks are working on their positions, writing oﬀ loans or selling portfolios where there is enough capital
leeway, but the stock remains high.Source: EBA
There is a chance, however, that this extra help by the government, by avoiding ﬁnancial stability risks puts in
motion a virtuous cycle by which stronger valuations in ﬁnancial markets attracts more investors and the economic
recovery and the recovery in house prices help a speedier reduction in the stock of NPLs. In other countries, it is
less likely that banks will be able to steadily reducing their stock without government intervention. As a result, the
recent intervention in Italy may well be the start of a third wave of government intervention in the countries most
exposed to non-performing loans, with an increasingly lower probability that the injections of capital will produce
positive returns over time.
Conclusions: a stylised look at the three waves of the crisis
Having addressed banking problems in earnest was a plus for the countries that did it. A ﬁrst massive intervention
happened right after the US-induced shock in ﬁnancial markets following the sub-prime crisis. With the exception of
contingent liabilities, interventions were deﬁcit and debt increasing. Impaired assets resulted in substantial capital
needs to address the losses and this was done more or less swiftly in 2008-2009 and aﬀected mainly Germany, the
UK, Ireland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Luxembourg, Austria and to a lesser extent France. Government
intervention to support the banking sector in the initial stage of the crisis was truly massive, but it seems to have
resulted in a somewhat smaller economic impact and a quicker recovery in credit.
The second wave of banking problems started with the Greek crisis and produced its eﬀects on State aid, deﬁcits
and debt mostly from 2011 onwards. This second wave triggered again massive public intervention and resulted in
an ESM programme for the Spanish government to support the banks. In parallel, European leaders said “never
again” and wanted to break the link between banks and sovereigns. This led to the re-introduction of State Aid rules
in the summer of 2013 and then the introduction on the Bank Resolution and Restructuring Directive (BRRD), which
became eﬀective in January 2016.
Government intervention was much smaller in absolute terms but massive relative to the GDP of the countries
aﬀected by the second wave. Intervention was severely constrained by deteriorated public ﬁnances and negative
feedback loop between sovereigns and the banks to the point that, in the case of Spain, European money became
necessary.
Since then, the attitude has changed and the European framework moved in the direction of forcing investors and
depositors to pay for any future crisis. In the meantime, however, policymakers did not recognised promptly enough
the creeping deterioration in non-performing loans and their eﬀect on lending and the broader economy, and the
possibility of intervention became much more limited.
As a result, the situation continued to deteriorate up until today’s crisis in Italy, which may be the start of a third wave
of government intervention in the EU. It mainly relates to the leftovers of the previous crisis and the lagged impact
on non-performing loans. Luckily enough, the economy has improved in the meantime and banks have worked out
their solutions as well. Today’s banking problems in Italy are manageable and are likely to require substantially less
public money than in the past in other countries. However, the stock of non-performing loans is much higher in other
peripheral countries and thus more casualties are to be expected during the course of 2017.
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor
of the London School of Economics. Featured image: Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena, Siena, Italy. Credits: DV
(CC BY-SA 3.0).
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